The history and memory of foresight
Attempts at foresight are as old as humanity itself. But la prospective (French foresight) has been structured as a discipline since the 1940s and 1950s, a period which, according to Bernard Cazes,[1] saw a twofold process of professionalisation and institutionalisation of its practices. Since then, these practices have evolved according to the context, cultures, needs and tools available in other disciplines. This page sheds some light on the history of foresight.
[1] Cazes Bernard, Histoire des futurs. Les figures de l’avenir de saint Augustin au XXIe siècle, Paris: L’Harmattan (coll. Prospective), 2008.
The origins of the word “prospective”
The French word ‘prospectif/ve’ derives directly from the late Latin prospectivus — a, um — meaning ‘to see far ahead’ or ‘to offer a perspective’ (according to the Centre national des ressources textuelles et lexicales of the CNRS).
Historically, this adjective has been used to describe something that looks to the future: un regard prospectif (a foresighted outlook), un état d’esprit prospectif (a foresighted state of mind / Gaston Berger), une approche prospective (a forward-looking approach) to issues. La prospective (which we will refer to as ‘foresight’ in the remainder of this text) was already known in the Renaissance as ‘the faculty of forecasting’.
François Villon, at the end of his Petit Testament of 1456, presents it as an intellectual faculty related to memory, estimative (judgement with measure), formative (capacity to imagine) and similative. [1]
[1] In his Lexique, André Burger explains the terms used and the faculties associated with foresight. Thus, the opinative, false or true, is the ‘faculty of forming a judgement’, the estimative is the ‘faculty of forming value judgements’, the prospective is the ‘faculty of forecasting’, the similative is the ‘faculty of comparing’, while the formative would be the ‘faculty of forming concepts, ideas’. See Burger André, Lexique complet de la langue de Villon, Geneva: Droz, 1974.
1930-1960: birth and foundations
Historically, the birth and development of foresight as a discipline are linked to a need for anticipation on the part of decision-makers. Foresight has been developing since the 1930s, when it became apparent that certain players needed to base decisions that would have a lasting impact on the future on solid anticipations. In all these early works, the aim was to know, understand and anticipate before making decisions and taking action.
In the 1930s, when Roosevelt decided that the federal government should intervene in the economic and social spheres to remedy the crisis (New Deal), he commissioned a study of the major social trends. From the 1940s onwards, the first foresight studies were developed mainly in response to military concerns. The US Air Force commissioned a study from Theodore von Karman on the technical advances that could be of military interest (Towards New Horizons, 1947), and a few years later entrusted Douglas Aircraft with responsibility for a research and development project (the Rand project) on the non-land aspects of international conflicts.
In France, at the end of the 1950s, Gaston Berger reinvented the term prospective (foresight) in an article published in La Revue des deux mondes (no. 3, 1957). In 1960, Bertrand de Jouvenel coined the concept of ‘futuribles’ and set up the Futuribles International Committee. Both were driven by humanist and social concerns. Futures studies were published in two publications: Prospective, the journal published by Gaston Berger’s Centre d’études prospectives, and the Futuribles bulletins published by SÉDÉIS (Société d’études et de documentation économiques, industrielles et sociales) from 1960 onwards.
From the 1960s: methodological and institutional structuring
‘La prospective [foresight]’ as a noun appeared in the 1960s and refers to studies about the future that were being developed in the public sphere, mainly in the United States and France. During this period, numerous organisations dedicated to foresight were set up, either on private or public initiative. In all cases, public support and that of major foundations and companies were essential to the development of these organisations.
In France, the Futuribles international association was created in 1968, continuing the work of the Futuribles International Committee and that of Gaston Berger’s Centre d’études prospectives (who died in 1960). It has increasingly close links with the Commissariat Général du Plan and the DATAR (Délégation à l’aménagement du territoire et à l’action régionale), the two main instigators of foresight approaches for public policy development (the Plans, regional planning).
On a European and international scale, awareness of the major global issues and the peace movement are also driving the development of foresight. Examples include the Mankind 2000 group set up by James WeIlesley-Wesley under the aegis of Robert Jungk, and the work of pacifist Johan Galtung.
The 1960s and 1970s saw the emergence of a large number of formalised foresight methods. The community of futurists and planners was animated by rich methodological discussions. From this period onwards, there was a diversity of approaches, including in the ways in which scenarios were developed and used. Herman Kahn, for example, insisted on the value of very ‘trend’ scenarios, while Hasan Özbekhan reversed the traditional approach and developed ‘anticipation’ scenarios, which start from the future and end in the present.[1]
This methodological corpus led to the emergence of the first foresight courses in France in the 1980s. Michel Godet was appointed Professor at the Conservatoire national des arts et métiers (CNAM) in 1982, when the Industrial Foresight Chair was created. Futuribles also developed its first foresight training courses in the 1980s.
The prospectiviste (futurist) thus became a fashionable term in the 1970s and 1980s, qualifying the specialist, the expert in foresight as a discipline. In 1976, the World Futures Studies Federation (WFSF) was created to bring together these ‘futurists’ and facilitate their interaction.
Foresight developed in multilateral organisations,[2] in particular at the United Nations (Léontief report, The Future of World Economy / L’Avenir de l’économie mondiale, UN, 1976), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, Interfuturs programme directed by Jacques Lesourne and leading to a report in 1979), and later at the European Commission, where Jacques Delors set up a ‘foresight unit’ in 1989.
[1] See in particular http://www.laprospective.fr/dyn/francais/memoire/trp/methode-scenarios-trp-59-1975.pdf
[2] Duhautois Sibylle, Un Destin commun ? Études sur le futur dans les organisations internationales et formation d’une conscience globale pendant la guerre froide (1945-1989), thesis, PhD diss, Sciences Po Paris, 2017.
The 1990s and 2000s: a new generation of players and a boom in participation
As it developed, foresight took on more diverse, more diffuse and less clearly identifiable forms.
As the major public contracts gradually ran out of steam, it was the private sector (Shell, EDF, General Electric, etc.) that took up foresight as a tool to help them develop their long-term strategies.
The crises of the 1970s and the end of the Cold War seem to have led to a decline in the demand for foresight in international bodies, at least in the form of major, highly ambitious projects. Foresight became more a part of institutional practice, without necessarily having highly visible programmes.
This is also the case in France, where the Commissariat général du Plan and the DATAR are gradually losing their planning functions.
From the 1990s onwards, with the general trend towards decentralisation in Europe, territorial foresight also developed strongly as a tool to assist in the development of regional and local public policies.
In terms of methods, it was from the 1990s onwards that a more participative form of foresight was developed, with an increasing emphasis on involving stakeholders in thinking about the future.
At the beginning of the 2000s, faced on the one hand with institutional difficulties in thinking about the future, and on the other with the development of local initiatives and a more creative civil society, according to the report Prospective, débat, décision publique [Foresight, debate, public decision-making] produced by Jean-Paul Bailly for the Conseil économique et social (Economic and Social Council) in 1998, the ‘prospective du présent’ (foresight of the present) approach was proposed. Foresight of the present proposes a continuous process of learning and listening to stakeholders, with an ‘acute reading’ of the present. It involves imagining desirable futures together, and making them possible. It does not, therefore, take place upstream of the decision-making process. “Foresight of the present aims to develop a collective intelligence of situations,[1] shared by all the players concerned, likely to lead to ‘acting together’ throughout future decision-making processes” (Édith Heurgon).[2]
[1] It should be noted that this product of foresight work is not specific to this approach. For example, in Prospective stratégique d’entreprise (Paris: Dunod, 2001), Jean-François de Andria, Director of Planning and Strategy for the Renault group, points out that the decisive contribution of foresight is that of a reworking of representations, enabling a strengthening of the capacity to understand the environment and therefore to take action.
[2] Heurgon Édith and Laudier Isabelle, “Prospective du présent : co-construisons des visions d’avenir”, Caisse des dépôts, 10 June 2020.
The years 2010-2020…: diversification of approaches
Transitions: a spur or a poison for foresight?
Since the early 2010s, the term ‘transition’ has developed considerably. ‘Transitions’, which can cover digital, ecological and ageing issues, generally involve taking account of trends, but also setting out objectives and the means to achieve them. From this point of view, they appear to be new ways of orchestrating public action over the long term, as planning once was. Supporting or organising these transitions is the focus of a great deal of foresight work, particularly in the fields of the environment (climate, resources, etc.) and energy, but also in social areas (the ‘democratic transition’, for example). Often, however, these transitions are marked by the display of unrealistic objectives that are not supported by rigorous foresight work. Their proliferation and lack of coordination can lead to relative inefficiency.
The ‘transition’ theme has helped to strengthen the links between exploring what is possible and creating what is desirable. Over the last two decades, there has been a growing dialogue between stakeholders, experts and citizens to explore possible responses to major transitions, and to enable the recognition and emergence of change agents and collective actions to build desirable futures.
In France, they can be found in open innovation labs, the various ‘fabriques du futur’ and the Institut des futurs souhaitables.
Imagination and design fiction
Since around 2010, foresight research has also been making more significant use of imaginary worlds, probably as a result of an increasingly marked counter-utopian context, a range of possibilities that seems to be narrowing, and the growing importance of fiction in our representations. The imaginary worlds of science fiction are very prevalent in the United States (travel to Mars, transhumanism, metaverse, etc.) and feed into the strategic visions of major players.
For example, the Plurality University Network, set up at the end of 2010, has set itself the goal of ‘exploring and opening up the possibility of alternative futures, by mobilising the resources of the imagination (art, fiction, speculation, etc.)’. The intuition behind it ‘is that ecological and social transformation requires us to question the representations we have inherited from the past, and to imagine other worlds and other ways of being in the world’.
The practice of design fiction has been developing in recent years. Design fiction is based on the construction of ‘disruptive’ visions of society, with no desire to anticipate what will happen. The fiction produced aims to question prevailing practices, norms and values. Prototypes of new social organisations, solutions, objects and business models are often explored.
Development of discontinuities and shocks scenarios
Another significant change in recent years has been the development of approaches based on discontinuity or shock scenarios, which do not necessarily aim to describe probable futures, but possible futures with varying probabilities of occurrence but with very strong impacts. Their aim is to raise awareness of certain risks, to encourage their prevention as far as possible, to reduce their impact, and to enhance the ability of populations and organisations to cope with and recover from them, in situations where traditional levers for action have lost control. A crisis scenario leads us to think outside the cone of possibilities, asking questions about the meaning of action, the boundaries of organisations and even their raison d’être.
A great deal of work of this kind is being carried out from the perspective of ‘resilience’.
From participation to ‘futures literacy’
The movement towards stakeholder participation and association, which has been going on for several decades, has given rise to the ‘futures literacy’ movement, which is an extension of this. The fundamental idea is that the futures we imagine define the potentials we see in the present, and that democracy must therefore focus on the way in which futures are designed and built. Promoted by UNESCO and championed by Riel Miller, this approach is designed to develop the skills needed to create and explore the future collaboratively, through training and practice. Developing the right mindset for anticipation and taking account of cognitive biases are key. This ‘capability’ applies to personal and professional life, and to issues of collective action.
Integrating cultural aspects, creating ‘spaces for change’: causal layered analysis
A pioneer in taking cultural aspects into account, the approach promoted by Sohail Inayatullah proposes a framework for analysis and a working method. The framework recommends working on several levels of analysis and their relationships: recurring discourse and its origins, system analysis (variables and their relationships), the worldviews of the players, and a symbolic level, corresponding to the archetypes present or highlighted in visions of the future (myths, models, etc., such as collapse, rebirth, etc.). The method aims to deconstruct the issue under study before creating spaces for change; it’s about building alternative futures, not predicting the future. This approach has developed strongly over the last 20 years in many parts of the world, particularly in Asia and Oceania.
Hybridizing approaches
Most decision-makers today find themselves faced with a paradox: the need to project themselves into a world that is not only uncertain but also partly unpredictable, and the concomitant need to make decisions that have a bearing on the future (public policies, investments), including decisions to reduce risks and prepare for crises.
The corpus of foresight has been enriched over the last 70 years, and today offers a wide range of approaches and techniques that can help resolve these paradoxes and encourage the collective construction of desirable futures. The approaches that prove effective are generally those that combine a good capacity for analysis with a strong commitment to change. There are no magic recipes for good foresight, but there are plenty of ingredients available.
