Journal

What if Israel Bombed Iran?

Account and possible consequences of a ‘what-if’ scenario

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Important note: this scenario was written in October 2023, when the conflict between Israel and Hamas had just broken out. It is, of course, necessary to exercise extreme caution when devising a credible scenario, as events may develop at a pace that makes the present exercise useless. This scenario serves more as food for thought about the possible consequences if the Israeli army were to launch an attack on Iran, in an extremely tense regional context.

At the time of writing, anything is possible in the Middle East. Nevertheless, given Israel’s priorities — to punish Hamas — the possibility of a large-scale strike on Iran is relatively remote: Tzahal (the Israeli Defence Forces, or IDF) is fully engaged in and around its territory, and a dispersal of military resources is unlikely. Nevertheless, it may be useful to consider the prospect of a strike on Iran because, on the one hand, the possibility of such raids has repeatedly been mentioned and, on the other, the situation would be changed if it were confirmed that Iran had been involved in organising, planning, and carrying out the deadly Hamas incursions on 7 October. It is therefore relevant, as a tool for reflection, to consider this particular “what-if” scenario.

Outbreak

The Israeli (Mossad) and American (CIA) secret services become convinced that the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 was in fact planned, financed, and supervised by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Israeli authorities therefore decide, with Washington’s consent, to take offensive action against Iran.

The operation raises a number of difficulties, mainly of a technical and political nature. However, the mastermind of the operation manages to persuade Israeli officials that the attack should not be directed against the most obvious targets, that is, the sites associated with Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programmes, since striking these targets would serve only to slow down Tehran’s projects, rather than guaranteeing Israel’s security. The raid therefore follows a different philosophy: in order to ensure Israel’s long-term security, it aims to strike at the head of the regime in a way that will bring about an uprising among the Iranian people. The hope is that this will lead to the fall of the Islamic regime and an end to this government that is so hostile to the Jewish state.

The general idea behind this raid, focused on political rather than military goals, quickly wins over a large number of Israeli officials, particularly in the left-wing political parties. Its aim is not to weaken the Islamic Republic of Iran’s capacity to cause harm, but to decapitate a regime which, since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, has continually called for the destruction of the “Zionist regime” occupying the territory that it calls Al-Quds (Jerusalem, Islam’s third holiest site).

The targets of the raid are therefore the command centres and barracks of the Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) in Iran’s main cities, as well as the barracks of the bassidji (the Islamic militia responsible for maintaining order) and the compounds of detention centres where political prisoners are held, such as the notorious Evin Prison in Tehran. These actions are to be preceded by a powerful cyber-attack on Iranian communications centres, followed by a massive appeal on Iranian radio stations and social networks to encourage the population to take advantage of the strikes to overthrow the regime. The Israeli government approves the operation, which is given the codename “Holofernes” (the name of the Assyrian general beheaded by Judith in the Old Testament).

The Iranian Population and the Situation in Israel Today

Iranians, who have shown their dissatisfaction with the regime since 2022 following the death of Mahsa Amini, do not generally feel concerned by the conflict between Israel and Islamic militias such as Hamas and Hezbollah. To take a recent example, on 9 October 2023, at a football match in Tehran, hundreds of Iranians booed (to put it mildly) the few Hamas flags that had been displayed by supporters of the regime. The majority feeling is that the Iranian state is wasting far too many resources (probably more than a billion US dollars a year) supporting a cause that is only marginally relevant to them, while the internal economic situation remains catastrophic.

An event similar to the death of Mahsa Amini took place in the Tehran metro at the beginning of October, which left a 16-year-old girl in a state of brain death… This could reactivate protest movements against the regime.

The Material Resources Required and Political Obstacles to the Operation

The territories of Israel and Iran are relatively distant from one another: Tel Aviv and Tehran are almost 2,000 kilometres apart. As a result, the range of Israel’s F-15 fighter bombers is insufficient to make the round trip, so in-flight refuelling is necessary. IDF pilots are trained to do this, and the air force has several Boeing 707 refuelling aircraft at its disposal.

However, the flight paths to Iran involve overflying states that are not very friendly to Israel: Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia (despite the recent rapprochement between Riyadh and Tel Aviv, which has been undermined by the war with Hamas). It is conceivable that strong political pressure from the US could bring about authorisation to fly over Saudi territory and carry out in-flight refuelling in their air space. The US Air Force could also take part in these operations. The US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, headquartered in Bahrain, could provide anti-missile support, electronic jamming, and intelligence assistance, as well as providing cover for Israeli fighter bombers taking part in raids on Iran.

The raids planned by the Israelis would focus on the main Iranian cities in the western half of the country, favouring those where popular protest following the death of Mahsa Amini was strongest: Tehran, Tabriz (in Iranian Azerbaijan), the main Kurdish cities such as Mahabad and Sanandaj (Mahsa Amini belonged to the Kurdish minority), Isfahan, and Shiraz.

The raids would target sites crucial to the command and control capabilities of the Revolutionary Guard, their barracks located in and around cities, and political prisons. These prisons would be hit by precision missiles with the aim of breaching the perimeter walls and facilitating the escape of prisoners.

These raids would mobilise the majority of the IDF’s fighter bombers: between 70 and 80 F-15 Eagles and Strike Eagles (out of the hundred or so in service), several refuelling aircraft escorted by F-16s, as well as electronic warfare aircraft to jam Iranian radars. Finally, the new F-35s would also be put to work, deploying around twenty aircraft, or half the available fleet.

The task of refuelling such a volume of aircraft would require the assistance of the US Air Force: American tanker aircraft would then be positioned under the protection of destroyers equipped with the Aegis anti-missile system, allowing them to act in complete safety. The only limitation imposed by the White House on US involvement would be that its own forces should not be directly involved in offensive action: in addition to air-to-air refuelling, the US would contribute anti-bunker munitions, intelligence for target selection, and jamming and cyber support.

The Raids

The raids are scheduled to take place in the early hours of the morning, preceded by a massive cyberattack targeting Iranian communications, command centres, and air defence. Some of Iran’s response capability is neutralised by these efforts.

Thanks to intelligence provided by the Iranian Resistance, the home of the head of the Revolutionary Guards is identified and destroyed, while anti-bunker bombs pulverise the headquarters of the Pasdaran. Missiles equipped with cluster munitions fall on the main Revolutionary Guard barracks, causing widespread destruction. Some Basij barracks are also targeted in the Iranian capital. The compound of the Evin political prison is destroyed in several places, leading to an insurrection among the inmates. A similar scenario occurs in the other towns targeted by the raid.

At the same time, the country’s radio waves are saturated with calls for revolt, particularly via BBC Persian, the BBC subsidiary broadcasting news from the region. Social networks, which continue to function despite the measures taken by the authorities to control the internet, are also flooded with messages conveying information about the raid, images of the destroyed barracks, and calls for insurrection… The former national anthem, Ey Iran, is played extensively.

Most of the Israeli aircraft manage to return to Israel after a second refuelling operation, which is more perilous than that of the outward journey, as the Iranian air defence systems and air force finally manage to mobilise some resistance. However, thanks to the protection provided by US support, the operation proceeds without too many difficulties. Several aircraft are nevertheless forced to reroute to Azerbaijan, which has always been at loggerheads with Tehran and has benefited from Israeli arms transfers. Israeli losses prove to be limited and largely acceptable.

The Raids: Revolution or Reaction?

From this point in the scenario, two main trajectories are possible. In the first case, the outcome of the raids is a great success for the Israelis, while the second possibility is for a disappointing outcome for the Israelis, with particularly harmful consequences.

– In the first scenario, the Iranian population takes to the streets of the main cities in great numbers. The Islamic regime is completely caught off guard, with attacks on communications centres causing chaos and confusion, greatly reducing the ability of the Islamic Republic’s top leadership to react.

In Tehran, a crowd moves towards the main centres of power and invades Evin Prison. The police are overwhelmed, while the Basij are challenged by a population bursting with anger and frustration. The Pasdaran units, badly hit by the raid, can only muster limited resistance. The authorities call in units of the Artesh, the regular army, which is mainly made up of conscripts. But these units refuse to obey orders to repress the uprising, and gradually join the rebels in the streets of Tehran, who now number in the hundreds of thousands, if not millions.

A similar situation occurs in the city of Tabriz, which has historically been hostile to central government, as well as in Isfahan and Shiraz. In Iranian Kurdistan, underground fighters from the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran join the insurgents.

The Islamic Republic’s state apparatus fail to get a grip on the situation. Other towns that were not directly affected by the raids also rise up. The Leader of the Revolution, Ayatollah Khamenei, weakened by illness, dies in the course of the exfiltration attempt organised by his entourage. In Tehran, crowds invade the Majlis, the Iranian parliament. Opposition figures, previously imprisoned or under house arrest, make their way there and proclaim the abolition of the Islamic Republic.

This scenario could lead to the establishment of a democratic regime in Iran after a period of confusion, although it is difficult to determine how long such a period could last. However, it is almost certain that Israel’s security situation would be permanently improved, thereby fulfilling the overall objective of the raids against Iran. Indeed, it is likely that a democratic Iran would choose to rapidly normalise its relations with the Jewish state, as was the case under the imperial regime. Without the dominance of Islamist rhetoric calling for the destruction of the Zionist regime, Iran would find few obstacles to a rapprochement with Tel Aviv. Financial support for the Lebanese Hezbollah would cease immediately, which would weaken the hand of this militia party in the politics of Lebanon. The same would apply to Shia militias in Iraq and support for the Yemeni Houthis.[1]

Relations with the US would also be re-established, with the American Iranian diaspora making a major return to the mother country, which would also help to bring in human and financial capital. However, relations with countries with a Sunni Muslim majority, and Saudi Arabia in particular, would not necessarily improve. A non-Islamic Iranian regime would retain a fundamental dimension of Iranian political culture: nationalism and the preservation of Iran’s regional role. Tehran could therefore adopt a posture of balance between Russia and the US, close to the Indian posture of non-alignment. The new Iranian authorities would prioritise the preservation of national interests, while also displaying an attitude aimed at attracting capital to develop its economy.

– The second hypothesis would be less favourable for the Israelis. The expected effects of the raids fail to materialise: the Islamic regime manages to hold onto sufficient repressive force to violently suppress popular protest. The authorities call for revenge for the Israeli attack and promise devastating reprisals.

The first likely outcome would be Tehran calling on the Lebanese Hezbollah to commit all its available forces to the battle against the Jewish state. Ballistic missiles would probably be fired against American bases in Bahrain, as well as oil terminals in Saudi Arabia, to punish the latter for allowing Israeli planes to fly over its territory. The Strait of Hormuz would immediately be mined, which, combined with the attacks on Saudi terminals, would cause an unprecedented oil shock. Every branch and ally of the Islamic regime in the Arab world would be mobilised: Shiite militias in Iraq, Houthis in Yemen, militias linked to Tehran in Syria, etc. The Leader of the Revolution would proclaim Holy War against Israel and the US, which could cause a general conflagration in the Middle East. Russia could take advantage of the situation to draw a little closer to Arab and Islamic regimes, presenting itself as the defender of the oppressed victims of Western and American imperialism. China could adopt a similar position, while also calling for de-escalation. The consequences would be catastrophic, particularly if Israel’s very existence were to be threatened. If Tel Aviv were backed into a corner, the mentality of the “Masada complex”[2] could resurface, potentially leading to Israeli nuclear strikes against the main Arab capitals and major Iranian cities.

This article has been translated from French by Sam Ferguson.

  1. Editor’s note: The Houthi movement is a Shia Islamist political and military organization which is predominantly made up of Zaidi Shias.

  2. Editor’s note: The propensity of the State of Israel to always see itself as a fortress under siege, in reference to the siege of Masada by the Romans in 72 AD.

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