We are witnessing a new stage in the technological war being waged by two world powers, China and the United States. Since the beginning of August, Beijing has tightened its export controls on gallium and germanium, two critical raw materials used in the manufacture of batteries, certain semiconductors, and the latest generation of military radars. These measures come nine months after the US tightened controls on the most advanced range of semiconductors, those used in military artificial intelligence applications. While the news is a strong signal of Beijing’s determination to engage in a confrontation, or even an escalation with Washington on the issue of trade and technology restrictions, this struggle between the world’s two largest economies is a highly unequal one. This is the perspective presented by John Seaman, researcher at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) and author of “China’s Weaponization of Gallium and Germanium” (published this summer), in this interview with Futuribles.
A year ago, the US adopted a strategy that, by extending the existing framework of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), tightened restrictions on the export of strategic technological components to China, covering a wide range of areas (chips, advanced semiconductors, supercomputers, etc.). Can you elaborate on the implications of this initial decision?
J.S.: Yes, the export controls introduced by the US on 7 October 2022 concern the most advanced ranges of semiconductors, memory chips, and the logic chips[1] used to manage data flows, particularly for artificial intelligence (AI) systems. The American authorities are most worried about the military uses of AI. The current policy is to no longer make any distinction between civilian and military uses of AI, since the boundary between the two is so fluid. This stance is particularly a response to Chinese initiatives to get civilian and military companies working together on these technologies. This development is very worrying for the Americans. The measures that Washington has put in place affect this type of semiconductor, but also the machines capable of manufacturing them, which are on the point of producing semiconductors measuring as little as seven or even three nanometres.
However, the US has a dominant position concerning some of the software used in the manufacture of semiconductors, and thanks to its dominant position upstream in the value chain it can block China’s access to very specific market segments, with the help of other countries. The US can put pressure on their European and Asian partners, more or less prohibiting them from exporting semiconductors (South Korea and Taiwan) or the machinery needed to build them (the Netherlands and Japan). As well as semiconductors, tools, and materials, this is also a question of know-how. All American citizens are prohibited from cooperating with China in this area.
But doesn’t China also have a strong position? In your article, you point out that China currently supplies more than 95% of the world’s raw gallium and 60% of refined germanium. Isn’t there a risk that Beijing could stifle the American economy by prohibiting access to these critical raw materials?
J.S.: China does have certain levers at its disposal, but they are ...
